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STUDENT NOTES
THE APpLCABILTY OF STATE INHEBITANCE TAx STATUTES
To UNrEn STATES SAVINGS BONDS
United States Savings Bonds when issued to individuals may be

registered in three forms: (1) in the name of one person; (2) in the
names of two persons in the alternative as co-owners; and (3) in
the name of one person payable on death to one other person.'
2
States may impose inheritance taxes upon these bonds.
The federal regulations provide that a bond registered in the
names of two persons as co-owners will be reissued or paid as follows:
(1) "During the lives of both co-owners the bonds will be paid
to either co-owner upon his separate request without requiring the
signature of the other co-owner; and upon payment to either coowner the other person shall cease to have any interest in the bond";
and (2) "If either co-owner dies without having presented and surrendered the bonds for payment or authorized reissue, the surviving
co-owner will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner of the
bond and payment or reissue will be made only to such surviver, as
3
though the bonds were registered in his name alone."
'31 C.F.R. §§ 315.4, 315.5, 315.6 (Supp. 1956).
2 31 C.F.R. §§ 316.5, 318.2 (Supp. 1956). Contra, Succession of Tanner,
24 So. 2d 642 (La. App. 1946). But see Succession of Raborn, 210 La. 1033,
29 So. 2d 53 (1946), where the court refused to follow the Tanner case.
3 31 C.F.R. § 315.45 (Supp. 1956); In re Kaspari's Estate, 71 N.W.2d 558
(N.D. 1955).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1957

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 4 [1957], Art. 7

STUDENT NOTES
A savings bond registered in the name of one person payable on
death to another "will be paid to the registered owner during his
lifetime . .. as though no beneficiary had been named.... The
bond will be reissued, on the . . . request of the registered owner,
to name the beneficiary designated on the bond as co-owner. The
bond will also be reissued upon the . . .request of the registered
owner together with the.., consent of the designated beneficiary,
to eliminate such beneficiary. . . . If the beneficiary should predecease the registered owner... the bond may be reissued as though
it were registered in his name alone."4 These regulations have been
held to be part of the provisions of the bonds. 5
Although the federal regulations 6 clearly establish the power of
a state to impose an inheritance tax on savings bonds, the question
remains as to whether or not the statutory language covers the
particular form of registration. This is to be determined by the
7
state court.
The pertinent parts of the West Virginia inheritance tax statute
are as follows:
A tax is to be imposed on the transfer of property, if such transfer be: "(c) ...intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after such death; (d) by any person who shall transfer any
property which he owns, or shall cause any property to which he is
absolutely entitled to be transferred to or vested in himself and any
other person jointly, with the right of survivorship ....in such other
person, a transfer shall be deemed to occur and to be taxable...
upon the vesting of such title in the survivor. .
Sole Form
The sole form of registration is plainly subject to the general
state inheritance tax statute. 9
Beneficiary Form
When the beneficiary form "A, payable on death to B," is used,
there ordinarily should be no difficulty in imposing an inheritance
431 C.F.R. § 315.46 (Supp. 1956).
5

Ervin v. Conn, 225 N.C. 267, 34 S.E.2d 402 (1945).

6Supra note 2.
7 In re Brown's Estate, 122 Mont. 451, 206 P.2d 816, 823 (1949) (dissent).

8W.VA. CODE c. 11, art. 11, § 1 (Michie 1955).
9 Supra note 2.
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tax on the bond on A's death.' 0 The majority rule concerning the
beneficiary form is that when the co-owner dies the regulations
confer absolute title on the survivor and do not merely designate persons to receive payments. 1' Although it is a question of statutory
construction, a transfer is so clearly taking place on A's death that
there should be no doubt as to the applicability of the general inheritance tax statute. In Mitchell v. Carson12 the Tennessee court
held the beneficiary form taxable. There, A retained possession of
the bonds. The court decided that due to this retention, B's ownership took effect in possession and enjoyment upon A's death. A had
an interest that ended only by his death. Section (C)13 of the West
Virginia inheritance tax statute would be applicable to impose a
tax in this situation.
A few courts have used the theory that the beneficiary acquires
a presently vested, though defeasible interest, when the bonds are
purchased and that the decedents death ended his rights, thereby
leaving the beneficiary with an indefeasible right.14 However, the
more accurate rationale appears to be that no present full interest
is created in the beneficiary, but that the only present interest
created is "that the beneficiary could not be changed while the
bond remained outstanding and upon the death of the donor the
outstanding bond belonged absolutely to the surviving beneficiary."' 5
"A and B" Form
When bonds are registered in the form of "A and B" it has been
held that the registrants are joint owners and upon the death of one
of them, his share in the bonds would be included in his estate and
10 Gould v. Johnson, 146 Me. 366, 82 A.2d 88 (1951). Contra, In re DcWater's Estate, 338 Mich. 457, 61 N.W.2d 779 (1953).
11Ervin v. Conn, 225 N.C. 267, 34 S.E.2d 402 (1945); Harvey v. Rack.
liffe, 141 Me. 169, 41 A.2d 455 (1945). But cf. District of Columbia v. Wilson,
216 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1954). In this case the remainderman purchased the
bonds and no inheritance tax was imposed on the death of the life tenant.
Franklin Washington Trust Co. v. Beltram, 133 N.J. Eq. 11, 29 A.2d 854,
(1943). Contra, Slater v. Culpepper, 222 La. 962, 64 So. 2d 234 (1953).
12 186 Tenn. 228, 209 S.W.2d 20 (1948); accord, Hallett v. Bailey, 143
Me. 1, 54 A.2d 533 (1947); Succession of Raborn, 210 La. 1033, 29 So. 2d

53 (1946).
13 Supra note 8.

14 Reynolds v. Danko, 134 N.J. Eq. 560, 36 A.2d 420 (1944).
15 In re De Santo's Estate, 142 Ohio St. 223, 51 N.E.2d 639 (1943).
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the survivor would retain the other half interest.' 6 Under this
theory a tax could be imposed upon one-half the value of the bonds
at most. But in In re MesserschmidsEstate,17 where the purchaser
retained possession, the full value of the bonds was taxed on his
death. While in In re Comb's Estate' 8 the court held that the
amount of the bonds which was not contributed by the survivor is
taxable. The theory used in the Messerschmidt case would be
applicable to impose a tax under section (c)1 9 of the West Virginia
statute.
"A or B" Form
Under the general rule when bonds are registered in the form
of "A or B". a federal contract is created between the purchaser
and the United States Government. 20 States do not have the power
to modify such contracts. The terms of the contract and not state
laws are used to determine the rights of the surviving co-owner. 21
The "or" form of bonds may be surrounded by numerous factual
situations a few of which will be discussed. First let us consider the
situation in which the decedent paid for the bonds and retained
possession of them. A Tennessee court 22 found on these facts that
the decedent "owned an interest in these bonds which at her option
was determinable only by her death." That by reason of the decedent's retention, the possession and enjoyment of the bonds by
the survivor took effect only upon the decedent's death. As a result,
these bonds were included in the language of the Tennessee inheritance tax statute. The court went on to say that the retention
of possession by the decedent, until her death, conclusively estab-.
lished it to have been her intention that the beneficiary's ownership
of these bonds should take effect in possession or enjoyment on her
death.
6

Waltenberger v. Pearson, 81 Ohio App. 51, 77 N.E.2d 491 (1946). In
this case the court found that the "A and B" form of registration was unauthorized. It should be noted that under present regulations such registration is
authorized in Series E bonds. Supra note 1.
1773 N.W.2d 123 (S.D. 1955).
18 90 N.E.2d 440 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949).
19 Supra note 8.
20
Conrad v. Conrad, 66 Cal. App. 2d 280, 152 P.2d 221 (1944). This
proposition
also applies to other authorized forms of registration.
21
Ervin v. Conn, 225 N.C. 267, 84 S.E.2d 402 (1945).
22 Mitchell v. Carson, 186 Tenn. 228, 209 S.W.2d 20 (1948); accord, In re
Rummel's Estate, 74 S.D. 131, 49 N.W.2d 380 (1951); State Board v. Cole,
122 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d 989 (1948).
3
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It has been said that the test is whether or not the decedent "has
irrevocably parted with all his interest, title, possession and enjoyment in his lifetime." If he has not then a taxable transfer occurs
23
at death.
Although a recent opinion of the Attorney General of West
Virginia 24 expresses a contrary view, it is believed that the West
Virginia court would have little difficulty in imposing a tax in this
situation. This is due to section (C) 25 of the West Virginia statute
to the effect that a tax is to be imposed if a transfer is "intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after such death."
A different situation arises when the beneficiary is in possession at the time of the donor's death. A North Dakota court found
here that a completed inter vivos gift took place by the voluntary
delivery prior to death. Therefore, from the time of delivery, the
decedent had no interest in the bonds which he might legally
his death, so that the
enforce. As a result no interest passed on
26
inapplicable.
was
statute
tax
inheritance
However, in Weeks v. Johnson27 the court held that such an
inter vivos transfer was ineffectual because there was no compliance with the pertinent federal regulations2 8 concerning reissue. Therefore the status of the bonds was just the same as if
no transfer was attempted and they were subject to a tax.
Another situation arises when both the donor and the beneficiary have possession. Where the donor died first a North Carolina court in Watkins v. Shaw,2 9 found that such joint possession
alone did not establish an inter vivos gift; but that the gift was
"intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his
death. . . ." Therefore the entire amount of the bonds was subject
to the inheritance tax statute by implication. However, when the
beneficiary died first a Pennsylvania court held that the inheritbut assessed it on only one-half of the value
ance tax applied,
30
of the bonds.
2

re Myer's Estate, 359 Pa. 577, 60 A.2d 50 (1948).
Op., Att'y Gen. (W. Va., Aug. 3, 1956).
Supra note 8.
2
0Littlejohn v. County Judge, 79 N.D. 550, 58 N.W.2d 278 (1958).
27 146 Me. 871, 82 A.2d 416 (1951).
28 81 C.F.R. §§ 815.45, 315.46 (Supp. 1956).
29 284 N.C. 96, 65 S.E.2d 881 (1951).
30
In re Graham's Estate, 858 Pa. 383, 57 A.2d 853 (1948).
3 In

24
25
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Section (c) of the West Virginia inheritance tax statute s ' is
very similar to this North Carolina statute and there should be no
question as to the taxability of the bonds under these circumstances.
However, the question as to the amount of the bonds that is to be
taxed will still remain.
Where the donor retains sole possession and the beneficiary dies
first, one-half of the value of the bonds are subject to the Connecticut inheritance tax statute which imposes a tax on the right of survivor to property in joint names of decedent and survivor.3 2 Section
(d) of the West Virginia inheritance tax statute3 3 could be applied
to this situation although the court may have difficulty in doing so.
Conclusion
The general rule is that inheritance tax statutes are to be construed in favor of the taxpayer, and most strongly against the government.3 4 However, as was stated in a Tennessee case3 5 the courts
must still be careful to "give full scope to the legislative intent and
apply a rule of construction that will not defeat the plain purposes
of the act."
The mere fact that John Doe adds such words as "or Jane Doe"
after his name in the registering of a bond should not have the
effect of avoiding an inheritance tax on his death. By keeping possession of the bond he has absolute control as a practical matter, the
same as if the bond were registered in his sole name, for under the
federal regulations he can cash the bond without the signature of
Jane Doe.36 Therefore, it is submitted that courts should be primarily engaged with the legislative intent concerning the policy
behind the statute, rather than with the encouraging of persons to
avoid tax statutes by the use of mere technicalities.
M. J. P.

31 Supra note 8.
32

Connelly v. Kellogg, 136 Conn. 38, 68 A.2d 170 (1949).

33 Supra note 8.
34 Central Trust Co. v. Tax Comm'r, 116 W. Va. 37, 178 S.E. 520 (1985).

35 Bergeda v. State, 179 Tenn. 460, 167 S.W.2d 838 (1943).
36 Supra note 3.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol59/iss4/7

6

